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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISPTCTIQN 
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court 
of the Second Judicial District denying Christine E-.irus (Barrus) 
relief, following a de. novo review of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding before the State of Utah, Department of Human 
Services. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the 
1 
determination of this case: 
42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a) (17) (1985) 
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1994) 
Utah Department of Human Services, Office of Family Support 
Policy Manual, Volume II, §§ 122 and 438. See Addendum A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARD PF REVIEW 
Appellant Barrus misstates one of the issues before the 
Court. Since Barrus admits that the evidence does not support a 
finding that her caseworker made an express representation upon 
which she relied to her detriment,1 the issue on appeal is not 
whether the "court erred in not finding that Barrus' caseworker 
made a representation regarding Barrus' eligibility for AFDC upon 
which Barrus relied to her detriment." (Appellant's Br. at 1.) 
In addition, Appellant does not argue that her "lump sum" 
receipt of Social Security disability insurance funds should not 
have affected her household's eligibility for AFDC funds for a 
three month period. Barrus merely asserts that "had she known of 
the impending period of ineligibility, she would not have spent 
all of the lump sum but would have kept most of it for her 
children's needs." (Appellant's Br. at 8.) Therefore, properly 
'See Appellant's Br. at 14. 
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framed, the sole issue before this Court is: 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the State's 
caseworker had no legal duty to tell Barrus how to spend her 
Social Security lump sum award and thus the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel did not apply? 
This issue presents a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness. See generally: Trujillo v. Jenkins. 84 0 
P.2d 777, 778-779 (Utah 1992). Since the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is a highly fact dependent question, the trial court's 
application of equitable estoppel will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion. State of Utah v. Irizarry, 893 P.2d 
1107, 1108 (Utah App. 1995) cert, granted. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 
1995); Trplley Square Associates v, Nielsen, 886 p.2d 6i, 65 
(Utah App. 1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Christine Barrus was an AFDC recipient, along with her 
household unit, beginning in January 1994. In June 1994, she 
received a lump sum Social Security disability insurance (DIB) 
retroactive payment of $2226, placing her over the income limit 
for a household of her size.2 On July 6, 1994, the Ogden Office 
2The State adopts Appellant's acronyms of UDIB" for 
Disability Insurance Benefits and "SSI" for Supplemental Security 
3 
of Family Support (OFS) notified Barrus that her household was-
ineligible for financial assistance for a three-month period of 
time as a result of the receipt of the lump sum DIB payment. She 
requested an informal administrative hearing to challenge that 
decision. Barrus continued to receive AFDC benefits while her 
case was pending. The State hearing officer upheld the position 
of the Office of Family Support and an overpayment was assessed 
against Barrus for three months of AFDC assistance she received 
during the pendency of her administrative review hearing. Barrus 
filed a de novo appeal to the Second District Court. The court 
issued a final order upholding the agency's decision. Barrus now 
seeks appellate review of the district court's final order 
denying her financial assistance for three months and upholding 
the overpayment assessment. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
Christine Barrus is a disabled individual who applied for 
certain Social Security benefits.3 At the time of her 
Income. 
3Barrus testified that she made her Social Security 
application in 1992 and had "Social Security court" in May 1993. 
(R. 197). However, Appellant's Exhibit 2 indicates that Barrus 
filed her application on May 14, 1993, seeking Social Security 
benefits commencing February 15, 1993. (R. 166). According to 
Exhibit 2, the Social Security administrative law judge issued a 
4 
application, she did not understand exactly what benefits she may 
have been entitled to or even what benefits she was seeking from 
the Social Security Administration.4 (R. 197) . 
Barrus applied for AFDC and Medicaid from the State of Utah 
in January 1994 and began receiving benefits that month. (R. 2, 
201-202) . At the time of her application, she supplied the 
Ogden Office of Family Support with her husband's pay stubs, her 
rent and utility receipts, and the papers that she had turned 
into the Social Security Administration. (R. 202). By April 
1994, Barrus and her husband were the custodial care givers for 
her husband's four children, who had been placed with them 
pursuant to an Oregon court order. (R. 200). A fifth child 
joined the household in August 1994. (R. 200). During this 
time, Barrus and her stepchildren were all receiving AFDC and 
Medicaid. Barrus' caseworker was Shannon Freestone of the Ogden 
OFS. (R. 201). 
On April 25, 1994, a representative of Barrus wrote to 
favorable decision on Barrus' Title II and Title XVI applications 
on May 24, 1994. 
4As indicated in Appellant's Exhibit 2, Barrus in fact had 
applied for Social Security Title II benefits (Disability 
Insurance Benefits, "DIB") and Title XVI benefits (Supplemental 
Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, USSI"). (R. 
165-167). 
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Shannon Freestone and informed her that Barrus had been told by a 
Social Security administrative law judge that he would be 
awarding benefits in her favor. 
We have received the judgement letter, a copy of which 
was sent to Ms. Barrus and could be had from her. It 
will take about sixty days from now before she receives 
her retroactive benefit. 
(Appellant's Exhibit 1, R. 164). 
Barrus was being helped by a "representative" who had 
assisted her at her Social Security hearing and afterwards. (R. 
203-205). The May 24, 1994 letter which granted Barrus a 
retroactive award of DIB and SSI benefits did not indicate when 
Barrus would be receiving those lump sum awards or what the 
amount of each award would be. 
The May 24, 1994 letter had a Human Services date stamp 
receipt of May 26, 1996. However, Barrus did not remember if she 
personally delivered the letter to Freestone or if she just 
dropped it off at the office. (R. 208). Barrus did recall 
having spoken to Freestone at some point about "lump sums." 
Barrus does not recall when this conversation occurred. (R. 
209). Barrus testified that, at the time she spoke with 
Freestone, she still did not understand the difference between 
DIB and SSI. (R. 210). On June 23, 1994, the Social Security 
6 
Administration advised Barrus that she would be receiving a check 
for $2,226 for retroactive DIB benefits. The letter stated: 
You'll get a check soon for $2,226.00, the amount 
you're due for August 1993 through May 1994. . . About 
July 03, 1994, you'll get your regular monthly Social 
Security check for $225.00. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 4, R. 169). This June 23, 1994 letter was 
forwarded to the Office of Family Support and received on June 
28, 1994. (R. 75, 169). 
Barrus actually received the lump sum check at the end of 
June 1994. (R. 213). When she received the check, she deposited 
the check at Zions Bank and copied the deposit slip. She took a 
copy of the deposit slip to the OFS office and left it there. 
Barrus does not recall talking to Freestone on the date she left 
the deposit slip copy at OFS. (R. 214).5 
Once she had deposited the lump sum check, Barrus used the 
money to perform car repairs, to purchase new tires, car 
insurance, a bed, and to pay phone bills. Within a few days, 
Barrus had spent nearly all of the lump sum money and had only 
$200 of the check remaining available to her. (R. 215). The OFS 
case record indicates that, as late as June 30, 1994, the OFS 
5A copy of this deposit slip was not made part of the record 
below. 
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caseworker was still attempting to determine how much of the 
$2,226 lump sum Barrus would be receiving and when she would 
receive it. (R. 170). Barrus spent the lump sum DIB award very 
quickly without contacting her caseworker directly for advice of 
any kind. 
On July 6, 1994, Barrus was informed by the Office of Family 
Support that her financial and medical assistance cases would be 
closed July 31, 1994 due to her receipt of the $2226 lump sum 
payment which put her over the income limit for her household 
size. Her household unit was found to be ineligible for three 
months. This period of ineligibility was determined by taking 
the lump sum and other income she received in July and dividing 
it by the AFDC standard' needs budget for her household size. (R. 
168) . 
Shannon Freestone, the OFS caseworker, testified that she 
had never told Barrus how to spend her lump sum payment. Indeed, 
Freestone indicated that she would be unable to opine as to the 
effect of a lump sum payment until the payment was finally issued 
and received by the client. Freestone also stated that she would 
never advise clients on how to spend their money. (R. 234). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Congress has created financial coverage for disabled and 
needy individuals to be paid for with federal and state funds. 
Consistent with Congressional objectives and state statutes, the 
Department of Human Services, Office of Family Support, 
determines who will receive assistance based upon the need of all 
who may be eligible. It is reasonable and appropriate for the 
agency to distribute scarce public funds by rendering ineligible 
those who have accumulated assets from which they could provide 
for the costs of their own care. 
In 1981, Congress enacted a "lump sum" rule for the purpose 
of requiring AFDC households to utilize certain lump sum amounts 
to meet their daily living needs with lump sum monies, rather 
than with taxpayer dollars, for the period of calculated 
ineligibility. Admittedly, the "lump sum" rule will, in some 
situations, cause hardships to recipients who may have large 
accrued bills which they would like to pay with their lump sum 
monies. However, that does not change the fact that Congress 
wished to create an incentive for AFDC recipients of lump sums to 
budget such sums for monthly necessities and to eliminate the 
incentive to spend the money all at once. 
It is the decision of Congress to accept some harsh results 
9 
in order to achieve incentives which Congress found desirable, 
including the savings of tax dollars when a welfare recipient 
receives an unexpected lump sum, which in some cases may be a 
windfall (such as a lottery check). The State of Utah must 
accept such harsh results and enforce them to the extent that 
Congress has mandated those results. 
Equitable estoppel does not apply to defeat the State's 
claim for an overpayment because the OFS caseworker had no duty 
to advise Barrus how to spend her lump sum monies, particularly 
when Barrus did not even attempt to discuss the effects of the 
lump sum with her caseworker after her receipt of the money. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT FOUND THAT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DID NOT APPLY 
AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH SINCE THE CASEWORKER HAD 
NO DUTY TO TELL BARRUS TO BUDGET HER LUMP SUM 
AWARD. 
Barrus makes the unusual argument that she should not be 
compelled to repay three months of AFDC her household received 
because her OFS caseworker was silent in advising her how to 
spend a lump sum DIB check she received from the Social Security 
Administration.6 
6A person seeking federal disability will often file for 
Disability Income Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social 
10 
General Background: AFDC Lump Sum Rule 
Under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program, participating States that provide financial assistance 
to families with needy, dependent children are partially 
reimbursed by the federal government. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 601-615 
(1985 Sc Supp. 1996) . Although States are largely free to 
determine the appropriate standard of need and the level of 
assistance, they must administer their assistance plans in 
conformity with applicable federal statutes and with regulations 
promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS). Those statutes require States to consider a 
family's "income and resources'7 when determining whether or not 
it is needy and prohibit States from providing AFDC benefits for 
any month in which either income or resources of a recipient 
exceed state-prescribed limits. 42 U.S.C.S. § 602 (a) (7) (A) , (B) 
Security Act (42 U.S.C.S, § 423) (1988 & Supp. 1996) and for 
Social Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 1382) (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
Retroactive Social Security DIB benefits accrued during the 
pendency of a disability application are considered "unearned 
income." £g£ 45 C.F.R. § 233.30(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1994). In 
contrast, the payment of retroactive SSI benefits is not 
considered either income or resources to an assistance unit 
applying for or receiving AFDC. 45 C.F.R. § 
233.20(a) (3) (x) (1994) . Therefore, Barrus' retroactive SSI 
benefits are not relevant to this appeal. 
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(1985 & Supp. 1996) . All types of income and resources 
available to applicants or recipients will be taken into 
consideration in the same way. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1994). 
The lump sum rule for determining an AFDC recipient's income 
was added to the AFDC program by section 402(a)(17) of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA). See 42 
U.S.C.S. § 602(a) (17) (1985) . The statute was again amended in § 
2632 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1141, to give 
States the option of recalculating the period of ineligibility 
caused by receipt of a lump sum in three situations not 
applicable in Barrus' case. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 
602(a) (17) (i) , (ii) ,.(iii) (1985) . 
The lump sum regulation at 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (ii) (F), 
which was applied to Barrus, provides: 
When the AFDC assistance unit's income, after applying 
applicable disregards, exceeds the State need standard 
for the family because of receipt of nonrecurring 
earned or unearned lump sum income (including for AFDC, 
title II7 and other retroactive monthly benefits, and 
payments in the nature of a windfall, e.g., 
inheritances or lottery winnings, personal injury and 
worker compensation awards, to the extent that it is 
not earmarked and used for the purpose for which it is 
paid, i.e., monies for back medical bills resulting 
7Title II refers to that Title of the Social Security Act 
(the Act) which sets forth the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) of the Act. 
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from accidents or injury, funeral and burial costs, 
replacement or repair of resources, etc.), the family 
will be ineligible for aid for the full number of 
months derived by dividing the sum of the lump sum 
income and other income by the monthly need standard 
for a family of that size. Any income remaining from 
this calculation is income in the first month following 
the period of ineligibility. The period of 
ineligibility shall begin with the month of receipt of 
the nonrecurring income of, at State option, as late as 
the corresponding payment month. [8] 
The foregoing regulation requires that a lump sum DIB award 
be considered "unearned income" and taken into account in 
determining if a recipient and his or her household will continue 
to be eligible for AFDC assistance. As stated by Barrus, the 
lump sum rule will apply when an AFDC family member receives in a 
month a lump sum of non-recurring income which, together with the 
family's other income, exceeds the state's standard of need for 
that family for that month. See Appellant's Br., 9-10. 
In the case of the Barrus household, the State divided 
$2226--the DIB benefits received by Ms. Barrus--by the standard 
of need of her household size--$810--resulting in her family 
becoming ineligible for AFDC for three months. Even if the 
family spends the lump sum immediately for expenses not subject 
8This federal regulation is incorporated into Utah policy at 
Office of Family Support policy manual, Volume II, §§ 122 and 
438. (Addendum A). 
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to the exceptions in 42 U.S.C.S. 602(a) (17) and the family has no 
funds for support, the disqualification period continues as if 
the family had budgeted the lump sum funds to cover their 
standard needs budget. In essence, the lump sum rule is intended 
to force the family to use its lump sum payment to replace its 
AFDC grant during the proscribed period. See Gardebring v. 
Jenkins/ 485 U.S. 415, 417-418 (1988); Smith v. Concannon. 938 
F.2d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 1991). 
Barrus agrees that her DIB lump sum award did result in her 
and her household unit being ineligible for AFDC for the three 
month period. However, she argues that her overpayment 
assessment should l?e set aside because the OFS caseworker should 
have advised her that she needed to spend the lump sum award 
wisely or the caseworker should have advised her to treat her 
lump sum award as her AFDC grant rather than spending it for car 
expenses and other household expenses. 
Elements of Equitable Estoppel 
Equitable estoppel is established by proof of three 
essential, core elements: 
(1) a party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
that is inconsistent with a later asserted claim; 
(2) reasonable action or inaction by a second party, 
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
14 
admission, act, or failure to act; 
(3) injury to the second party resulting from allowing 
the first party to repudiate its statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. 
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 
514, 522 (Utah 1995); Mendez v. State Dept. Of Social Services, 
813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991). 
Silence as an Element of Estoppel 
Utah case law recognizes that silence when one ought to 
speak may sometimes satisfy the representation element of 
equitable estoppel. See Hunter v. Hunter 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 
1983); Morgan v. PQ^rfl of State tends, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 
1976); Firgt Inv. Cp, vT An<fergenf 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980). 
In general, however, for silence to satisfy an element of 
estoppel "'there must be a legal duty to speak, or there must be 
something willful or culpable in the silence which allows another 
to place himself in an unfavorable position by reason thereof." 
Utah State Building Com'n v. Great American Indemnity Co., 140 
P.2d 763, 771-772 (Utah 1943); First Inv. Co. v. Andersen. 621 
P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980). 
Barrus admits that the evidence in the case "does not 
support a finding that the caseworker made an express 
representation upon which she [Barrus] relied to her detriment." 
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Appellant's Br. at 14. However, Barrus asserts that 
[T]here is abundant evidence that Freestone remained 
silent when she reasonably could have determined what 
the effect of a lump sum would be on Barrus' 
eligibility. The caseworker had at least three 
opportunities to carry out her responsibility to 
"redetermine eligibility" and to provide Barrus with 
information so she could "make informed decisions." 
Appellant's Br. at 14. 
Barrus asserts that the lower court failed to consider 
whether the first element of estoppel was met by caseworker 
Freestone's silence. She refers to the lower court's memorandum 
decision and argues that it focused solely on whether an express 
representation had been made. Appellant's Br. at 12. 
While the lower court may not have expressly stated that 
Freestone had not "failed to act when she had a duty to act," the 
lower court determined that the caseworker had not made any 
express representations to Barrus upon which she could have 
relied. The court implicitly rejected arguments made by Barrus 
that Freestone had a legal duty to speak to advise Barrus about 
the impact of her lump sum DIB payment and that she failed in 
that duty. 
In her complaint, Barrus does not rely upon silence for her 
basis to assert equitable estoppel. Rather, Barrus alleges that 
she "relied on the advice of her caseworker that the retroactive 
16 
award of disability benefits would not affect her AFDC 
eligibility." (R. 3.) After the evidence at trial failed to 
support that allegation, Barrus changed her position to rely on 
Freestone's purported "silence" as the grounds for her equitable 
estoppel theory. The trial court, by not even mentioning 
silence on the part of the State caseworker "when she ought to 
have spoken" has concluded that, under the facts of this case, 
the caseworker was not required to explain to Barrus how she 
should have spent her lump sum monies. 
Barrus argues that the State caseworker, Shannon Freestone, 
was silent uin failing to apprise Barrus of how the receipt of a 
lump sum would affect her future eligibility"--silence which she 
argues satisfies the first element of equitable estoppel. 
Appellant's Br. at 13. Barrus admits that her receipt of DIB 
lump sum income resulted in her household's ineligibility for 
AFDC for the proscribed three month period. Id. at 10. 
Had she known that the DIB lump sum would have made her 
children ineligible, Barrus would have acted 
differently. . . [S]he would have kept a portion of the 
lump sum for her children's financial and medical 
needs. 
Id. at 20. 
Barrus contends that, upon the actual receipt of her DIB 
lump sum award, Freestone had a duty to find Barrus (before she 
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foolishly spent her lump sum monies) and advise her to be careful 
about her expenditures. There is absolutely no legal basis 
anywhere in state or federal law for this argument. The lump sum 
rule clearly applied to Barrus and her household and they clearly 
became ineligible for AFDC for the calculated period. 
Barrus claims that Freestone failed to speak on three 
separate occasions and thus failed in her responsibility to 
provide Barrus with information so she could make informed 
decisions. Barrus cites first to the April 25, 1994 letter from 
her "'representative" to Ms. Freestone. (R. 164) This letter 
refers to a conversation in which "we were told by Judge Farrer 
that he would be awarding benefits in her favor." This letter 
does not state the amounts of any benefits to be awarded nor does 
it state the source of any retroactive award. This letter did 
not create any duty on the part of the State caseworker to seek 
out Barrus and warn her about potential effects of certain Social 
Security awards, nor did it create a duty on behalf of the State 
to seek out Barrus to warn her to be careful about how she spent 
any such award, if and when it was received. 
In addition, Barrus points to the actual Social Security 
decision letter dated May 24, 1994 which was received by OFS on 
May 26, 1994. (R. 165). This letter does state that, based on 
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Barrus' Title II (DIB) application, she was found entitled to a 
period of disability commencing February 15, 1993 through the 
date of the decision. (R. 166). However, this letter does not 
state the amount of the DIB benefits which Barrus will receive 
nor does it state the exact date when Barrus will receive the 
lump sum check for these DIB benefits. Even if Freestone had 
sought out Barrus to advise her that the Title II DIB benefits 
referred to in the decision uwere the type of lump sum which 
would likely disqualify her children from benefits" (Appellant's 
Br., 16), the household would still have been disqualified from 
those benefits. Barrus now seeks to avoid that inevitable result 
by maintaining that Freestone never told her how to budget the 
amount. 
Lastly, Barrus alleges that even after the award letter was 
received, with the exact amount of the DIB lump sum, "Freestone 
remained silent." Appellant's Br., 17. This argument is 
particularly disingenuous given that the June 23, 1994 letter was 
not received by OFS until June 28. On June 30, Freestone asked 
Barrus for more information (R. 170), but Barrus had spent the 
bulk of the check within a few days. (R. 215). Freestone did 
not even know that Barrus had received the award until late June, 
probably after Barrus had already spent most of the money on her 
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car and other expenses. 
There is no question that it would have been in Barrus' and 
her household's best interest for her to discuss the effect of 
her DIB lump sum payment with her caseworker before she spent the 
entire amount. However, there is no support in case law or 
statutes for the proposition that a State caseworker must assume 
that an AFDC recipient will foolishly spend a lump sum award, 
regardless of its source, and that the caseworker must do 
everything in his or her power to attempt to advise the client 
about spending the lump sum wisely. 
It is not irrational to assume that most needy families 
will realize that the receipt of a large lump sum may 
affect their future eligibility for benefits, and that 
it would be prudent to inform their caseworkers of the 
development before- spending the money. 
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 431 (1988). 
There is no principle of law which would, under the 
circumstances as presented here, impose a duty to speak upon the 
OFS caseworker. To the contrary, given the intent and purpose of 
the lump sum legislation and regulation (incentive to get off the 
welfare rolls), any imposed obligation to speak may well thwart 
that intent and purpose. At a minimum, the duty to discuss the 
effect of a lump sum award lies with the welfare recipient and 
not with the State caseworker. While a caseworker may advise a 
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client not to spend a lump sum during the period of AFDC 
ineligibility, the caseworker cannot compel a client to budget a 
lump sum wisely to avoid harsh consequences for his or her 
household. 
Reasonable Reliance 
In this case, as the trial court concluded, the caseworker 
made no representation to Barrus upon which she relied to her 
detriment. No action or inaction on the part of OFS could have 
prevented the DIB lump sum award from resulting in the 
ineligibility of her household unit for the proscribed three 
months. Reasonable reliance could not be found where the client 
quickly dissipated her lump sum award, without consultation with 
her caseworker. At most, the caseworker could have advised 
Barrus to be frugal with her lump sum because it would be her 
sole source of support during the proscribed three months. 
However, Barrus chose to immediately spend her money without 
seeking the advice of her caseworker or her own representative 
who had helped her obtain the lump sum DIB award. She cannot now 
seek to avoid repayment of the AFDC assistance she received for 
the three months in which she was clearly ineligible for those 
benefits. 
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Application of Equitable Estoppel in this Case Would Result in 
Substantial Adverse Effects on Public Policy 
The general rule is that estoppel cannot be asserted against 
the government. Consolidated Coal Co.. 886 P.2d at 522; Utfrfr 
State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982); 
Breitlina Bros, v. Utah Golden Spikers. Inc.. 597 P.2d 869, 871 
(Utah 1979). Like most general rules, there are exceptions when 
the rigid application of the rule would defeat, rather than 
serve, the higher purpose that all rules are intended to serve: 
that of doing justice. 
In unusual circumstances, when it is plainly apparent 
that its application would result in injustice, and 
there would be no substantial adverse effect on public 
policy, the CQurts will honor the higher purpose of 
doing justice by invoking the exception, rather than 
departing from that desired objective in slavish 
adherence to a general rule. 
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co. 646 P.2d at 718 (Utah 1982). 
Barrus has suffered no manifest injustice by the overpayment 
assessed against her for the three months of AFDC benefits she 
received and for which she was ineligible. As noted previously, 
Congress was well aware of the potential harsh consequences of 
the lump sum rule. However, Congress also intended for AFDC 
recipients to be required to utilize certain lump sum payments to 
support their households and to relieve taxpayers of that 
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responsibility for a calculated period of ineligibility. 
Barrus asserts that government officials ought to be 
required to trace lump sum payments to AFDC recipients and advise 
those recipients of the consequences of those lump sums for their 
household. Such a burden would clearly impair governmental 
functions relating to administration of public assistance 
programs. 
Lump sum payments to AFDC recipients may be in many forms. 
Some lump sum payments may be countable as income and others will 
not be be countable as income. It is incumbent upon a welfare 
recipient to report all income, including lump sum income, to his 
or her caseworker immediately. However, until a lump sum is 
actually received by a recipient, a caseworker could only offer 
conjecture as to the impacts (if any) that sum may have on a 
household. Once the lump sum is received, if it is covered by 
the "lump sum" statutes and regulations as countable "income" to 
a recipient, then the caseworker must calculate the period of 
ineligibility and so advise the household. 
In this case, Barrus received the lump sum, allegedly left a 
copy of her deposit slip with the OFS office, and immediately 
spent her DIB lump sum money without consultation with her 
caseworker. It would not serve the public interest to mandate 
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that Freestone should have sought out Barrus to advise her to be 
prudent in spending her money. A foundation of public assistance 
policies is that recipients are to learn to be self-sufficient 
and responsible. Barrus, upon receipt of her lump sum, should 
have carefully discussed its impact with her caseworker. Upon 
learning of her household's mandatory period of ineligibility, 
she should have budgeted her money to care for her children's 
financial needs. 
To apply equitable estoppel against the government in this 
case would result in a serious adverse effect on public policy 
and would defeat the interest of the government in making public 
assistance recipients responsible for their personal affairs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, OFS's decision denying financial 
eligibility to Barrus for a three month period should be affirmed 
and Barrus should be required to pay the State for the three 
months of AFDC assistance she received when her household was 
ineligible for those benefits. 
DATED this /^Z) day of September, 1996. 
' LINDA LUINSTRA 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
42 USCS § 601, n 10 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
ble under conditions in each state, therefore, 
regulations are valid Jacquet v Westerfield 
(1978, CA5 La) 569 F2d 1339 
HEW (now HHS) regulation providing that 
state may recoup overpayments from current 
assistance payments as long as reductions in 
assistance are within "reasonable limits" and do 
not cause "undue hardship" to recipients is to be 
construed as not authorizing recoupment if it 
would deprive parent or child of shelter or 
subsistence necessary for maintenance of mini-
mum standard of health and well-being, and 
therefore does not conflict with Social Security 
Act (42 USCS §§601, 602(a)(10)) Harrell v 
Harder (1974, DC Conn) 369 F Supp 810, 18 
FRServ 2d 1281 
Federal regulations are violated by State De-
partment of Public Aid policy and practice of 
recoupment from current assistance payments 
without consideration on case-by-case basis of 
whether proposed reduction would cause assis-
tance unit undue hardship Howell v Trainor 
(1977, ND 111) 432 F Supp 1235 
11. Procedural requirements for reducing bene-
fits 
Form of notice proposed by state Department 
of Public Aid with respect to reasons for cancel-
lation or reduction of AFDC grants is insuffi-
cient where, although notice states ultimate rea-
son for reduction or cancellation of benefits, it 
fails to provide recipient with breakdown of 
income and allowable deductions, and therefore 
recipient has little protection against errors com-
mitted by Department in determining amount of 
his grant Dilda v Quern (1980, CA7 111) 612 
F2d 1055, cert den 447 US 935, 65 L Ed 2d 
1130, 100 S Ct 3039 and (disagreed with Garrett 
v Puett (CA6 Tenn) 707 F2d 930) 
Goldberg does not require prior notice and 
hearing when termination of assistance is pro-
duced by state-wide policy changes in welfare 
programs implemented pursuant to agency's leg-
islative rule-making function Whitfield v King 
(1973, MD Ala) 364 F Supp 1296, supp op (MD 
Ala) 399 F Supp 348, afTd 431 US 910, 53 L Ed 
2d 221, 97 SCt 2166 
Annotations 
Sufficiency of notice or hearing required prior 
to termination of welfare benefits 47 ALR3d 
277 
12. Judicial review 
Review of state welfare regulations under 
"least restrictive alternative" doctrine to insure 
that public assistance to poor persons is provided 
in manner not unnecessarily destructive of family 
unity is not mandated by (1) goal of AFDC 
program to encourage care of dependent children 
in their own homes or homes of relatives set 
forth at 42 USCS § 601, or (2) by requirement of 
42 USCS §602(a)(15) that each state submit 
plan "for preventing or reducing incidence of 
births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthen-
ing family life" Black v Beame (1977, CA2 NY) 
550 F2d 815 
Claimants asserting state policy violates rights 
under Equal Protection clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment and conflicts with various provi-
sions of Social Security Act of 1935 [42 USCS 
§§601 et seq ] can recover attorneys fees pursu-
ant to 42 USCS §§ 1983, 1988 even if recovery is 
based on claims other than constitutionally-based 
ones Lund v Affleck (1977, DC RI) 442 F Supp 
1109, affd (CA1 RI) 587 F2d 75 
§ 602. State plans for aid and services to needy families with 
children; contents; approval by Secretary; records and reports; 
treatment of earned income advances 
(a) Contents, A State plan for aid and services to needy families with 
children must— 
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the 
State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them; 
(2) provide for financial participation by the State; 
(3) either provide for the establishment or designation of a single State 
agency to administer the plan, or provide for the establishment or 
designation of a single State agency to supervise the administration of 
the plan; 
(4) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before, the 
^t*t<* <*crf*nn\r tn a n v ind iv idua l ii/hncp rlflim for fliri tn familip^ w i t h 
G R A N T S FOR D E P E N D E N T CHILDREN 42 USCS § 602 
(17) provide that if a child or relative applying for or receiving aid to 
families with dependent children, or any other person whose need the 
State considers when determining the income of a family, receives in any 
month an amount of earned or unearned income which, together with 
all other income for that month not excluded under paragraph (8), 
exceeds the State's standard of need applicable to the family of which he 
is a member— 
(A) such amount of income shall be considered income to such 
individual in the month received, and the family of which such person 
is a member shall be ineligible for aid under the plan for the whole 
number of months that equals (i) the sum of such amount and all 
other income received in such month, not excluded under paragraph 
(8), divided by (ii) the standard of need applicable to such family, and 
(B) any income remaining (which amount is less than the applicable 
monthly standard) shall be treated as income received in the first 
month following the period of ineligibility specified in subparagraph 
(A); 
except that the State may at its option recalculate the period of 
ineligibility otherwise determined under subparagraph (A) (but only with 
respect to the remaining months in such period) in any one or more of 
the following cases: (i) an event occurs which, had the family been 
receiving aid under the State plan for the month of the occurrence, 
would result in a change in the amount of aid payable for such month 
under the plan, or (ii) the income received has become unavailable to 
the members of the family for reasons that were beyond the control of 
such members, or (iii) the family incurs, becomes responsible for, and 
pays medical expenses (as allowed by the State) in a month of ineligibil-
ity determined under subparagraph (A) (which expenses may be consid-
ered as an offset against the amount of income received in the first 
month of such ineligibility); 
(18) provide that no family shall be eligible for aid under the plan for 
any month if, for that month, the total income of the family (other than 
payments under the plan), without application of paragraph (8), other 
than paragraph (8)(A)(v), exceeds 185 percent of the State's standard of 
need for a family of the same composition, except that in determining 
the total income of the family the State may exclude any earned income 
of a dependent child who is a full-time student, in such amounts and for 
such period of time (not to exceed 6 months) as the State may 
determine; 
(19) provide— 
(A) that every individual, as a condition of eligibility for aid under 
this part [42 USCS §§ 601 et seq.], shall register for manpower 
services, training, employment, and other employment-related activi-
ties (including employment search, not to exceed eight weeks in total 
in each year) with the Secretary of Labor as provided by regulations 
issued by him, unless such individual is— 
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- — ^ . « uu- l^4 EdHj^ provided that the individual was eligi-
ble on the date that the payment was 
made; except that where it has been de-
termined that the State agency had 
previously denied assistance to which 
the individual was entitled. Federal fi-
nancial participation will be provided 
in any corrective payment regardless 
of whether the individual is eligible on 
the date that the corrective payment is 
made. 
(4) Federal financial participation is 
ivailable in assistance payments which 
ire continued in accordance with the 
State plan, for a temporary period dur-
ng which the effects of an eligibility 
ondition are being overcome, e.g.. 
lindness in AB. disability in APTD. 
hysical or mental incapacity, contin-
ed absence of a parent, or unemploy-
lent of a principal earner in AFDC. 
(5) Where changed circumstances or a 
taring decision makes the individual 
eligible for any assistance, or eligible 
r a smaller amount of assistance 
an was actually paid, Federal finan-
aJ participation is available in excess 
yments to such individuals, for not 
>re than one month following the 
>nth in which the circumstances 
inged or the hearing decision was 
idered. Federal financial participa-
n is available where assistance is re-
red to be continued unadjusted be-
se a hearing has been requested. 
FR 3866, Feb. 27, 1971. as amended at 38 
8744. Apr. 6, 1973; 39 FR 26912. July 24. 
40 FR 32958. Aug. 5, 1975; 47 FR 5674. Feb. 
82; 47 FR 47828, Oct. 28, 1982; 51 FR 9204, 
5JN1986; 57 FR 30158. July 8. 1992] 
1.20 /Need and amount of assist-
-^Requirements for State Plans. A 
e Plan for OAA, AFDC, AB. APTD 
\BD must, as specified below: 
General, (i) Provide that the deter-
tion of need and amount of assist-
for all applicants and recipients 
>e made on an objective and equi-
basis and all types of income will 
tken into consideration in the 
way except where otherwise spe-
Ily authorized by Federal statute 
Provide that the needs, income, 
;sources of individuals receiving 
;nefits under title XVI. individ-
ith respect to whom Federal fos-
ter care payments are made, indivjj 
uals with respect to whom StatejS 
local foster care payments are maS! 
individuals with respect to whom Fe8| 
eral adoption assistance payments arS 
made, or individuals with respect/rto 
whom State or local adoption assiSH 
ance payments are made, for the perto? 
for which such benefits or payment 
are received, shall not be includedriffi 
determining the need and the amoung 
of the assistance payment of an AFDjy 
assistance unit; except that the need&l 
income, and resources of an individual 
with respect to whom Federal adoption! 
assistance payments are made, or indijF 
viduals with respect to whom State o 3 
local adoption assistance payments are! 
made are included in determining thej 
need and the amount of the assistance^ 
payment for an AFDC assistance unitf 
of which the individual would otherj 
wise be regarded as a member where] 
the amount of the assistance payment! 
that the unit would receive would notj 
be reduced by including the needs, in-j 
come, and resources of such individual.! 
Under this requirement, "individuals] 
receiving SSI benefits under title XVI' j 
include individuals receiving manda-j 
tory or optional State supplementary! 
payments under section 1616(a) of the ^ 
Social Security Act or under section 
212 of Public Law 9S-36. and "individ-
uals with respect to whom Federal fos-
ter care payments are made" means a 
child with respect to whom Federal fos-
ter care maintenance payments under 
section 472(b) and defined in section 
475(4)(A) of title IV-E of the Social Se-; 
curity Act are made, and a child whose 
costs in a foster family home or child 
care institution are covered by the 
Federal foster care maintenance pay-
ments made with respect to his or her 
minor parent under sections 472(h) and 
475(4)(B) of title IV-E. "Individuals 
with respect to whom Federal adoption 
assistance payments are made** means 
a child who receives payments made 
under an approved title IV-E plan 
based on an adoption assistance agree-
ment between the State and the adop-
tive parents of a child with special 
needs, pursuant to sections 473 and 
475(3) of the Social Security Act. 
(iii) For AFDC, when an individual 
who is required to be included in the 
assistance unit pursuant to 
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^ce of Family Assistance. ACF, HHS 
_
 l0(a)(l)(vii) is also required to be 
* luded in another assistance unit. 
!h°se assistance units must be consoli-
< ted, and treated as one assistance 
^nit f°r purposes of determining eligi-
bility and t n e a m o u n t o f payment, 
(iv) For AFDC. when a State learns 
f an individual who is required to be 
included in the assistance unit after 
the date he or she is required to be in-
cluded in the unit, the State must re-
determine the assistance unit's eligi-
bility and payment amount, including 
the need, income, and resources of the 
individual. This redetermination must 
be retroactive to the date that the in-
dividual was required to be in the as-
sistance unit either through birth/ 
adoption or by becoming a member of 
the household. Any resulting overpay-
ment must be recovered or corrective 
payment made pursuant to 
§233.20(a)(13). 
(v) In determining need and the 
amount of payment for AFDC. all in-
come and resources of an individual re-
quired to be in the assistance unit, but 
subject to sanction under §250.34 or be-
cause of an intentional program viola-
tion under the optional fraud control 
program implementing section 416 of 
the Social Security Act, are considered 
available to the assistance unit to the 
same extent that they would be if the 
person were not subject to a sanction. 
However, the needs of the sanctioned 
individual^) are not considered. In ac-
cord with § 250.34(c). if a parent in an 
AFDC-UP case is sanctioned pursuant 
to § 233.100(a)(5). the needs of the second 
parent are not taken into account in 
determining the family's need for as-
sistance and the amount of the assist-
ance payment unless the second parent 
is participating in the JOBS program. 
An individual required to be in an as-
sistance unit pursuant to 
§206.10(a)(l)(vii) but who fails to co-
operate in meeting a condition of his or 
her eligibility for assistance is a sanc-
tioned individual whose needs, income, 
and resources are treated in the man-
ner described above. 
(2) Standards of assistance, (i) Specify 
a statewide standard, expressed in 
money amounts, to be used in deter-
mining (a) the need of applicants and 
recipients and (6) the amount of the as-
sistance payment. 
§233.20 
(ii) In the AFDC plan, provide that 
by July 1. 1969. the State's standard of 
assistance for the AFDC program will 
have been adjusted to reflect fully 
changes in living costs since such 
standards were established, and any 
maximums that the State imposes on 
the amount of aid paid to families will 
have been proportionately adjusted. In 
such adjustment a consolidation of the 
standard (i.e., combining of items) may 
not result in a reduction in the content 
of the standard. In the event the State 
is not able to meet need in full under 
the adjusted standard, the State may 
make ratable reductions in accordance 
with paragraph (aX3Xviii) of this sec-
tion. Nevertheless, if a State maintains 
a system of dollar maximums these 
maximums must be proportionately ad-
justed in relation to the updated stand-
ards. 
(iii) Provide that the standard will be 
uniformly applied throughout the 
State except as provided under §239.54. 
(iv) Include the method used in deter-
mining need and the amount of the as-
sistance payment. For AFDC, the 
method must provide for rounding 
down to the next lower whole dollar 
when the result of determining the 
standard of need or the payment 
amount is not a whole dollar. Prora-
tion under §206.10(a)(6Xi)(D) to deter-
mine the amount of payment for the 
month of application must occur before 
rounding to determine the payment 
amount for that month. 
(v) If the State IV-A agency includes 
special need items in its standard: 
(A) Describe those that will be recog-
nized and the circumstances under 
which they will be included, and 
(B) Provide that they will be consid-
ered for all applicants and recipients 
requiring them; except that: 
(7) Under AFDC. work expenses and 
child care (or care of incapacitated 
adults living in the same home and re-
ceiving AFDC) resulting from employ-
ment or participation in either a CWEP 
or an employment search program can-
not be special needs, and 
(2) In a State which has a JOBS pro-
gram under Part 250. child care, trans-
portation, work-related expenses, other 
work-related supportive services, and 
the costs of education (including tui-
tion, books, and fees) resulting from 
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participation in JOBS (including par-
ticipation pursuant to §§250.46. 250.47. 
and 250.48) or any other education or 
training activity cannot be special 
needs. 
(vi) If the State chooses to establish 
the need of the individual on a basis 
that recognizes, as essential to his 
well-being, the presence in the home of 
other needy individuals. (A) specify the 
persons whose needs will be included in 
the individual's need, and (B) provide 
that the decision as to whether any in-
dividual will be recognized as essential 
to the recipient's well-being shall rest 
with the recipient. 
(vii) [Reservedl 
(viii) Provide that the money amount 
of any need item included in the stand-
ard will not be prorated or otherwise 
reduced solely because of the presence 
in the household of a non-legally re-
sponsible individual; and the agency 
will not assume any contribution from 
such individual for the support of the 
assistance unit except as provided in 
paragraphs (a)(3)(xiv) and (a)(5) of this 
section and §233.51 of this part. 
(ix) For AFDC. provide that a State 
shall consider utility payments made 
in lieu of any direct rental payment to 
a landlord or public housing agency to 
be shelter costs for applicants or re-
cipients living in housing assisted 
under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. as 
amended, and section 236 of the Na-
tional Housing Act. The amount con-
sidered as a shelter payment shall not 
exceed the total amount the applicant 
or recipient is expected to contribute 
for the cost of housing as determined 
by HUD. Utility payments means only 
those payments made directly to a 
utility company or supplier which are 
for gas. electricity, water, heating fuel, 
se we rage systems, and trash and gar-
bage collection. Utility payments are 
made "in lieu of any direct rental pay-
ment to a landlord or public housing 
agency" when, and only when, the 
AFDC family pays its entire required 
contribution at HUD's direction to one 
or more utility companies and does not 
make any direct payment to the land-
lord or the public housing agency. 
Housing covered by "the U.S. Housing 
Act of 1937. as amended, and section 236 
of the National Housing Act" means 
Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment assisted housing which in-
cludes Indian and public housing, sec^ j 
tion 8 new and existing rental housing; 
and section 236 rental housing. 
(3) Income and resources, (i) (A) OAA; 
AB, APTD, AABD, Specify the amount 
and types of real and personal prop-
erty, including liquid assets, that may 
be reserved, i.e., retained to meet the 
current and future needs while assist-
ance is received on a continuing basis. 
In addition to the home, personal ef-
fects, automobile and income produc-
ing property allowed by the agency, 
the amount of real and personal prop-
erty, including liquid assets, that can 
be reserved for each individual recipi-
ent shall not be in excess of two thou-
sand dollars. Policies may allow rea-
sonable proportions of income from 
businesses or farms to be used to in-
crease capital assets, so that income 
may be increased; and (B) in AFDC—i 
The amount of real and personal prop-
erty that can be reserved for each as-
sistance unit shall not be in excess of 
one thousand dollars equity value (or 
such lesser amount as the State speci-
fies in its State plan) excluding only: 
(/) The home which is the usual resi-
dence of the assistance unit; 
(2) One automobile, up to $1,500 of eq-
uity value or such lower limit as the 
State may specify in the State plan; 
(any excess equity value must be ap^ 
plied towards the general resource 
limit specified in the State plan); 
(3) One burial plot (as defined in thtf 
State plan) for each member of the as-
sistance unit; 
(4) Bona fide funeral agreements (as 
defined and within limits specified in 
the State plan) up to a total of $1,500 in 
equity value or such lower limit as the 
State may specify in the State plan for 
each member of the assistance unit 
(any excess equity value must be ap-^  
plied towards the general resource 
limit specified in the State plan). This 
provision addresses only formal agree-
ments for funeral and burial expenses 
such as burial contracts, burial trusts 
or other funeral arrangements (gen-
erally with licensed funeral directors) 
and does not apply to other assets (e.g., 
passbook bank accounts, simple set-* 
aside of savings, and cash surrender 
value of life insurance policies); 
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(5) Real property for a period of six 
consecutive months (or, at the option 
of the State, nine consecutive months) 
which the family is making a good 
faith effort (as defined in the State 
plan) to sell, subject to the following 
provisions. The family must sign an 
agreement to dispose of the property 
and to repay the amount of aid re-
ceived during such period that would 
not have been paid had the property 
been sold at the beginning of such pe-
riod, but not to exceed the amount of 
the net proceeds of the sale. The family 
has five working days from the date it 
realizes cash from the sale of the ex-
cess real property to repay the over-
payment; failure to make repayment 
within this period results in the cash 
being considered to be an available re-
source. If the family becomes ineligible 
for AFDC for any other reason during 
the conditional payment period while 
making a good faith effort to sell the 
property, or fails to sell the property 
by the end of the period despite such a 
good faith effort, then the amount of 
the overpayment attributable to the 
real property will not be determined 
and recovery will not be begun until 
the property is. in fact. sold. However. 
if the property was intentionally sold 
at less than fair market value so that 
a good faith effort to sell it was not 
made, or if it is otherwise determined 
that a good faith effort to sell the prop-
erty is not being made, the overpay-
ment amount shall be computed using 
the fair market value determined at 
the beginning of the period. For appli-
cants, the conditional payment period 
begins with the first payment month 
for which all otherwise applicable eligi-
bility conditions are met and payment 
is authorized. For recipients who ac-
quire property while receiving assist-
ance, the period begins with the pay-
ment month in which the recipient re-
ceives the property; and 
(6) At State option, basic mainte-
nance items essential to day-to-day 
living such as clothes, furniture and 
other similarly essential items of lim-
ited value. 
(ii) Provide that in determining need 
and the amount of the assistance pay-
ment, after all policies governing the 
reserves and allowances and disregard 
or setting aside of income and re-
sources referred to in this section have 
been uniformly applied: 
(A) In determining need, all remain-
ing income and resources shall be con-
sidered in relation to the State's need 
standard; 
(B) In determining financial eligi-
bility and the amount of the assistance 
payment all remaining income (except 
unemployment compensation received 
by an unemployed principal earner) 
and. except for AFDC. all resources 
may be considered in relation to either 
the State's need standard or the 
State's payment standard. Unemploy-
ment compensation received by an un-
employed principal earner shall be con-
sidered only by subtracting it from the 
amount of the assistance payment 
after the payment has been determined 
under the State's payment method; 
(C) States may have policies which 
provide for allocating an individual's 
income for his or her own support if 
the individual is not applying for or re-
ceiving assistance; for the support of 
other individuals living in the same 
household but not receiving assistance; 
and for the support of other individuals 
living in another household. Such 
other individuals are those who are or 
could be claimed by the individual as 
dependents for determining Federal 
personal income tax liability, or those 
he or she is legally obligated to sup-
port. No income may be allocated to 
meet the needs of an individual who 
has been sanctioned under §§224.51, 
232.11(a)(2). 232.12(d), 238.22 or 240.22 or 
who is required to be included in the 
assistance unit and has failed to co-
operate. The amount allocated for the 
individual and the other individuals 
who are living in the home must not 
exceed the State's need standard 
amount for a family group of the same 
composition. The amount allocated for 
individuals not living in the home 
must not exceed the amount actually 
paid. 
(D) Income after application of dis-
regards, except as provided in para-
graph (a)(3)(xiii) of this section, and re-
sources available for current use shall 
be considered. To the extent not incon-
sistent with any other provision of this 
chapter, income and resources are con-
sidered available both when actually 
available and when the applicant or re-
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clpient has a legal interest in a liq-
uidated sum and has the legal ability 
to make such sum available for support 
and maintenance. 
(E) For AFDC, income tax refunds, 
but such payments shall be considered 
is resources; and 
(F) When the AFDC assistance unit's 
ncome, after applying applicable dis-
c a r d s , exceeds the State need stand-
ard for the family because of receipt of 
lonrecurring earned or unearned lump 
um income (including for AFDC, title 
T and other retroactive monthly bene-
its, and payments in the nature of a 
Indfall, e.g., inheritances or lottery 
innings, personal injury and worker 
Dispensation awards, to the extent it 
i not earmarked and used for the pur-
use for which it is paid, i.e., monies 
>r back medical bills resulting from 
:cidents or injury, funeral and burial 
>sts, replacement or repair of re-
»urces, etc.). the family will be ineli-
ble for aid for the full number of 
onths derived by dividing the sum of 
e lump sum income and other income 
' the monthly need standard for a 
mily of that size. Any income re-
lining from this calculation is in-
me in the first month following the 
riod of ineligibility. The period of in-
gibility shall begin with the month 
receipt of the nonrecurring income 
at State option, as late as the cor-
ponding payment month. For pur-
les of applying the lump sum provi-
n, family includes all persons whose 
>ds are taken into account in deter-
ling eligibility and the amount of 
assistance payment, and includes 
5ly for determining the income and 
jurces of a family an individual who 
3t be in a family pursuant to 
UO(a)(l)(vii) but who does not meet 
indition of his or her eligibility due 
L failure to cooperate or is required 
law to have his or her needs ex-
led from an assistance unit's AFDC 
it calculation due to the failure to 
brm some action. A State may 
-ten the remaining period of ineli-
lity when: the standard of need in-
ses and the amount the family 
Id have received also changes (e.g., 
itlons involving additions to the 
ly unit during the period of ineli-
ity of persons who are otherwise 
ble for assistance); the lump sum 
income or a portion thereof becomes 
unavailable to the family for a reason 
beyond the control of the family; 01* 
the family incurs and pays for medical 
expenses. If the State chooses to short-
en the period of ineligibility, the State 
plan shall: 
(/) Identify which of the above situa-
tions are included; 
(2) In the case of situations involving 
an increase in the need standard and 
changes in the amount that should 
have been paid to the family, specify 
the types of circumstances which will 
be included; 
(3) In the case of situations involving 
the unavailability of the lump sum in-
come, include a definition of unavail-
ability, and specify what reasons will 
be considered beyond the control of the 
family; and 
(4) In the case of situations involving' 
the payment of medical expenses, 
specify the types of medical expenses 
the State will allow to be offset against 
the lump sum income. 
For purposes of this paragraph (a)(3): 
Automobile means a passenger car or 
other motor vehicle used to provide 
transportation of persons or goods. (In 
AFDC, in appropriate geographic areas, 
one alternate primary mode of trans-
portation may be substituted for the 
automobile); Equity value means fair 
market value minus encumbrances 
(legal debts); Fair market value means 
the price an item of a particular make, 
model, size, material or condition will 
sell for on the open market in the geo-
graphic area involved (If a motor vehi-
cle is especially equipped with appara-
tus for the handicapped, the apparatus 
shall not increase the value of the vehi-
cle); Liquid assets are those properties 
In the form of cash or other financial 
instruments which are convertible to 
cash and include savings accounts, 
checking accounts, stocks, bonds, mu-
tual fund shares, promissory notes, 
mortgages, cash value of insurance 
policies, and similar properties; Need 
standard means the money value as-
signed by the State to the basic and 
special needs it recognizes as essential 
for applicants and recipients; Payment 
standard means the amount from 
which non-exempt income is sub-
tracted; 
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(iii) States may prorate income re-
ceived by individuals employed on a 
contractual basis over the period of the 
contract or may prorate intermittent 
income received quarterly, semiannu-
ally, or yearly over the period covered 
by the income. In OAA, AB, APTD and 
AABD, they may use the prorated 
amount to determine need under 
§233.23 and the amount of the assist-
ance payment under §§233.24 and 233.25. 
In AFDC, they may use the prorated 
amount to determine need under 
§233.33 and the amount of the assist-
ance payment under §§233.34 and 233.35. 
(iv) Provide that in determining the 
availability of income and resources, 
the following will not be included as in-
come: 
(A) Except for AFDC, income equal 
to expenses reasonably attributable to 
the earning of income (including earn-
ings from public service employment); 
(B) Grants, such as scholarships, ob-
tained and used under conditions that 
preclude their use for current living 
costs; 
(C) Home produce of an applicant or 
recipient, utilized by him and his 
household for their own consumption; 
(D) For AFDC, any amounts paid by 
a State IV-A agency from State-only 
funds to meet needs of children receiv-
ing AFDC, if the payments are made 
under a statutorily-established State 
program which has been continuously 
in effect since before January 1, 1979; 
(E) For AFDC. income tax refunds, 
but such payments shall be considered 
as resources; and 
(F) At State option, small non-
recurring gifts, such as those for 
Christmas, birthdays and graduations, 
not to exceed $30 per recipient in any 
quarter; and 
(G) For AFDC, the amount paid to 
the family by the IV-A agency under 
§ 232.20(d) or, in a State that treats di-
rect support payments as income under 
§233.20(a)(3)(v)(B), the first $50 received 
by the assistance unit which represents 
a current monthly support obligation 
or a voluntary support payment. In no 
case shall the total amount disregarded 
exceed $50 per month per assistance 
unit. 
(v) Provide that agency policies will 
assure that: 
(A) In determining eligibility for an 
assistance payment, support payments 
assigned under §232.11 of this chapter 
will be treated in accordance with 
§232.20 and §232.21 of this chapter; and 
(B) In determining the amount of an 
assistance payment, assigned support 
payments retained in violation of 
§ 232.12(b)(4) of this chapter, will be 
counted as income to meet need unless 
the approved IV-A State plan provides 
that such support payments are subject 
to IV-D recovery under §§ 302.31(a)(3) 
and 303.80 of this title or unless such 
payments are sufficient to render the 
family ineligible as provided at §232.20 
of this chapter. 
(vi)(A) In family groups living to-
gether, income of the spouse is consid-
ered available for his spouse and in-
come of a parent is considered avail-
able for children under 21, except as 
provided in paragraphs (a)(3)(xiv) and 
(a)(3)(xviii) of this section for AFDC. If 
an individual is a spouse or parent who 
is a recipient of SSI benefits under 
title XVI, an individual with respect to 
whom Federal foster care payments are 
made, an individual with respect to 
whom State or local foster care pay-
ments are made, an individual with re-
spect to whom Federal adoption assist-
ance payments are made, or an individ-
ual with respect to whom State or 
local adoption assistance payments are 
made, then, for the period for which 
such benefits or payments are received, 
his or her income and resources shall 
not be counted as income and resources 
available to the AFDC unit except that 
a child receiving adoption assistance 
payments will not be excluded if such 
exclusion would cause the AFDC bene-
fits of the assistance unit of which the 
child would otherwise be considered a 
member to be reduced. For purposes of 
this exception, "a recipient of SSI ben-
efits under title XVI" includes a spouse 
or parent receiving mandatory or op-
tional State supplementary payments 
under section 1616(a) of the Social Se-
curity Act or under section 212 of Pub-
lic Law 93-66 and an "individual with 
respect to whom Federal foster care 
payments are made" means a child 
with respect to'whom Federal foster 
care maintenance payments are made 
under section 472(b) and defined in sec-
tion 475(4)(A) of thfe Act, and a child 
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122Eliaibilitv Workers 
1. Roles: 
Determine eligibility for temporary and appropriate benefits accurately 
and timely; select from a wide variety of programs those necessary to 
support clients in their efforts to become self sufficient. 
2. Responsibilities 
A. Contact each client who applies. 
B. Provide information so each client can make informed decisions. 
C. Determine with the client which programs are applicable to her 
circumstances. 
D. Explore strategies for overcoming barriers and assist the client to 
obtain needed services. 
E. Make appropriate referrals to the self sufficiency worker and allied 
agencies. 
F. Monitor and redetermine eligibility. 
G. Keep records which document eligibility and clients' movement 
toward goals. 
H. Encourage and support appropriately. 
3. Expectations: 
A. Use all skills, information, tools and resources available to assist 
the client. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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B. Refrain from assuming responsibilities which belong to the client. 
C. Foster clients' ownership of her self sufficiency pathway. 
D. Refrain from making moral or personal judgements. 
E. Observe the rights of the client — refer to Section 110 for rights 
of client. 
F. Safeguard information and protect confidentiality . 
G. Offer problem resolution opportunities. 
4. Rights: 
To keep professional and personal life separate. The professional 
worker is not expected to be the best friend of the clients. Rather 
the worker should be available to the clients in a professional setting. 
In that setting, the relationship with the clients will be a 
professional one. 
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438 Lump Sum Payments and Other Income in Excess of Standard Needs Budget: 
Lump sum payments, including (but not limited to) Social Security lump sums, VA 
lump sums, unemployment compensation lump sums, and other one time payments 
such as lottery winnings, severance pay and personal injury and worker 
compensation awards, are considered lump sum income. Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) payments are NOT lump sum payments. Lump sums can be earned 
or unearned income. 
1. If the net lump sum* is less than the Standard Needs Budget Figure it is to 
be considered as income in the month received. Determine if it is countable 
income by using the Best Estimate income rules found in Section 430 Any 
remaining amount left the month following the month of receipt is considered 
an asset. 
2. If a household's net countable income (including the net lump sum* payment) 
exceeds the standard needs budget, then the amount in excess of the 
standard needs budget will count as income for future months. 
3. All members included in the assistant unit will be ineligible for assistance for 
the number of months determined by dividing the net countable income 
received in the payment month by the standard need budget amount equal 
to the assistant unit's size for the payment month. Any income remaining 
from this calculation is counted as income in the first month following the 
period of ineligibility. 
* Net lump sum: That portion of a lump sum left after excluding: 
1. Legal fees expended in the effort to make the lump sum available AND 
2. Payments for past medical bills AND 
3. Funeral or burial expenses, if the lump sum was intended to cover funeral or burial 
expenses. 
Continued on the next page 
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4. A net lump sum* payment that causes the net countable income to 
exceed the standard budget will result in the case closure following the 
procedures in Section 816 for a decrease in benefit. The ineligible period 
for the household will begin the month the lumpsum is received. If due 
to the 10 day notice requirement, a payment is made the month of 
receipt or after the month of receipt of the lump sum, an overpayment 
has occurred. 
EXAMPLE: 
Ms. A has net countable income of $50.00 received in January. In 
January she also received a lump sum of $2,750. 
She has a household of two with a standard budget of $431. Determine 
her period of ineligibility by adding the $50.00 net countable income to 
the lump sum of $2,750. This equals $2,800. 
Divide $2,800 by the standard budget amount of $431.00. $431 will 
go into $2,800 six full times with a remainder of $214. 
Close the AFDC case at the end of January providing that you can give 
adequate notice. If payment must be made in February, write an 
overpayment for both January and February. The client is ineligible for 
six months beginning with January and ending with June. If the client 
reapplies in July, then the remainder of $214 will be added to any July 
income she may have to determine eligibility for July and the initial grant 
for July. 
5. A lump sum, in an amount greater than the standard budget, received 
before the date of application in the month of application, will result in 
the application being denied and a period of ineligibility being determined. 
If the case is ineligible, and the application is denied, then the month of 
application is the first month in the period of ineligibility. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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6. A lump sum, in an amount greater than the standard budget, received 
after the date of application in the month of application, will result in the 
case being closed effective the last day of the month of application. If 
payment must be made the next month, an overpayment for the 
application month and the next month has occurred. 
7. Do not count a lump sum received before the month of application. 
8. A lump sum received after the month of closure shall not be counted nor 
can it be used to extend the period of ineligibility. 
9. Treat new household members as a separate assistance unit if they meet 
the 2 rules below: 
A, The new member is born or moves into the home after the lump 
sum is received. 
AND 
B. The new member was not included as part of the SNB used to 
figure the period of ineligibility. 
Do not use the lump sum income when determining eligibility and grant 
amount. Use all other household income. Include the income of 
household members who are not eligible due to the receipt of the lump 
sum. 
The lump sum funds are not an asset for the new members. But, ail other 
household assets must be considered. 
Use the figures from Table II for the number of new household members to 
determine eligibility and the amount of payment. For example, if a child is born 
after the period of ineligibility is calculated, base the grant for that child on a 
household size of 1. 
Beginning the month following the last month of ineligibility, gH family members 
must be in one household. This rule applies even if there is an amount 
remaining from the lump sum that is used as income. 
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438-1 Shortening the Period of Ineligibility 
1. The period of ineligibility can be shortened only if one of 
the following occurs. 
A. The State increases the Standard Needs Budget. 
B. The household incurs, becomes responsible for, and pays 
medical expenses that are not covered by private insurance. 
Only the following medical expenses can be used: 
(1) Any expense that would be covered by the Medicaid 
Program but is not because the household member 
is not eligible for that program (see Table III, 
Vol. Ill-F). 
(2) Any Chiropractic Service, Naturopathic Service, or 
Pain Clinic Service. 
(3) Any paid prescriptions. 
(4) Co-payments made by Medicaid recipients for 
improper use of emergency room services. 
C. A disaster occurs that results in the lump sum becoming 
unavailable to the household for reasons beyond their 
control. Examples include earthquake, fire, flood, robbery, 
etc. The following conditions must be met: 
(1) The lump sum has been or* will be spent in 
connection with the disaster. 
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(2) Until the disaster occurred, the lump sum was used 
to provide food, clothing, or shelter. 
(3) The household has no other income or resources 
sufficient to meet the expenses of the disaster. 
The Regional Director or his designee must determine when a 
disaster has occurred. Document the decision in the following 
way: 
A. The Regional Director or his designee must write the 
decision on Form 689. 
B. File the original copy of the 689 and all supporting 
evidence in the case record. 
C. Send a copy of the 689 and all the supporting evidence to 
the Director of the Office of Family Support. 
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438-2 How to Recalculate the Period of Ineligibility 
1 . If there is a change in the standard needs budget (SNB), 
recalculate the period of ineligibility in the following way: 
A. Determine the amount of the lump sum that remains. 
Do this in the following manner: 
(1) Multiply the old SNB by the number of months 
the case has already been ineligible due to the 
receipt of the lump sum. 
(2) Subtract this amount from the original net 
countable income. This is the amount 
remaining. 
B. Divide the amount remaining by the new SNB. this 
is the number of months the household will remain 
ineligible. Any amount left over will only count for 
the month following the last month of ineligibility. 
2. If the period of ineligibility is short need for any reason 
other than a change in the SNB, calculate the new period 
eof ineligibility in the following way: 
A. Multiply the SNB by the number of months the case 
has already been ineligible due to the receipt of the 
lump sum. 
B. Add the figure obtained in "a" to the amount paid for 
medical expenses or lost due to a disaster. 
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C. Subtract the amount obtained in "b" from the 
original net countable income. This is the amount 
remaining. 
D. If the amount remaining is zero, the soonest the 
household is eligible is the date of the new 
application. 
E. If the amount remaining is greater than zero but less 
than the SNB, the soonest the household is eligible 
is the date of the new application. The amount 
remaining must be considered as income in the 
month following the last month of ineligibility. 
F. If the amount remaining is greater than the SNB, 
divide that amount by the SNB. This is the number 
of months the household is ineligible. Any amount 
remaining must count for the month following the 
last month of ineligibility. 
EXAMPLE: 
In January the Jones household receives a lump sum 
of $4100. The SNB is $400. If the ineligibility 
period is not shortened, the Jones household will be 
ineligible for 10 months, March through December. 
However, In April Mr. Jones is hospitalized, and in 
May he pays a $2000 hospital bill. The period of 
ineligibility should be shortened. This is done by 
following the steps below: 
A. Multiply SNB by 3. 
$ 4 0 0 X 3 = $1200 
(Continued on next page) 
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B. Add the $1200 to the medical bill that has 
been paid. 
$1200 + $2000 = $3200 
C. Subtract the $3200 from the amount of the 
original lump sum. 
$4100-$3200 = $900 
D. Divide the $900 by the SNB. 
$900 - $400= 2 with $100 left over. 
The Jones household is ineligible for 2 more 
months. They can apply again in August. 
The $ 100 will be income for August. 
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438-3 Lump Sums from Anv Source Paid for an SSI Recipient in an 
AFDC Household 
Do not count the lump sum for an SSI recipient as either income 
or resources. 
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